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Abstract We study the effects of opinion polls on election results in proportional
representation systems. Moderate voters have preferences over the vote shares received
by the parties so that an agent’s optimal voting decision might depend on the other
agents’ behavior. A voter’s information about other voters’ behavior can be improved
through a series of opinion polls. We show that the mass of undecided voters decreases
monotonically with the number of polls, but may not necessarily disappear. Voters
who remain undecided have centrist ideologies. On average a series of polls brings
the society closer to complete information even though specific polls may push the
election result away from the complete information case.
1 Introduction
The effects that opinion polls have on the electorate have been studied extensively.
The conclusion of the literature is that the publication of polls influences how the
electorate votes (Myerson and Weber 1993; Morton et al. 2015). This influence is
the reason why many countries have restrictions on how, when and if a poll should be
published. Chung (2012) provides information about poll restrictions in 83 countries
and finds existence of a blackout period for pre-election opinion polls in 38 of them.
The restrictions can range from a ban on publishing polls for a specific time before
B Christos Mavridis
c.mavridis@lancaster.ac.uk
Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín
iortuno@eco.uc3m.es
1 Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Bailrigg, Lancaster LA1 4YX, UK
2 Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe,
Madrid, Spain
123
298 C. Mavridis, I. Ortuño-Ortín
the election, like in Italy (15 days) or in Greece (15 days until 2014, 1 day since),
to an outright ban during the entire campaign period like in Singapore. In the last
decade in many countries there have been public discussions on whether these types
of restrictions should be posed or lifted. In 2012 India’s Chief Election Commissioner
stated that opinion polls and exit polls should both be banned.1 A 2013 survey in the
United Kingdom, where there is not a ban on publishing pre-election opinion polls,
showed that three out of ten MPs supported the idea of such a ban.2
These restrictions and discussions show that the issue of the interaction between
opinion polls and elections is important both from a theoretical and from a practical
point of view. The motive behind such bans is usually to let the electorate vote “trully”
without the influence of the results of opinion polls, an influence which is perceived
as bad. The fear that polls may be biased, in which case the electorate might base its
decision on false information, is often used to argue in favor of restrictions. Another
argument is that basing the decision itself on the information generated by opinion polls
might distort the election results away from the “ true” preferences of the electorate.3
On the other hand, opinion polls are useful inasmuch as they clear some uncertainty in
the political environment leading to more efficient decision making by political actors.
Examples of uncertainty include uncertainty about valence of the candidates as e.g.
in Kendall et al. (2015) or on the actual policy-ideology of candidates as in Baron
(1994).
In democracies with proportional representation system where parties compete for
parliament seats, these seats can be seen as a measure of political power; a ruling
party that controls enough seats to just secure a majority might be more moderate
in its policies than a party that controls a larger fraction of the parliament. For this
reason a moderate voter may choose not to vote for her favorite party if she feels that
it may be too strong. Therefore a moderate voter who is happier with a more equal (or
a particular) split of parliamentary seats would like to know how the rest of the voters
will vote before she decides her own vote, implying that she would need to have some
information about the distribution of the rest of the voters. This idea can be seen, for
example, in McMurray (2017) or in Morton et al. (2015). In an experimental study
Ceci and Kain (1982) show that moderate voters, when instructed that the latest poll
showed that a candidate “ commanded a substantial lead over the other”, tend to report
that they would vote for the trailing one.
The goal of this paper is to examine the effects that opinion polls might have in the
behavior of voters in proportional representation systems. In particular, we analyze
under what conditions the publication of opinion polls during the electoral campaign
leads to complete information. To do so, we construct a simple two-party proportional
representation system with a continuum of voters and fixed policy proposals. It is
1 Opinion, exit polls have no scientific basis: CEC (April 28, 2012). IBNLive. Retrieved from: http://
ibnlive.in.com/news/opinion-exit-polls-have-no-scientific-basis-cec/252787-3.html.
2 Eaton, David. Should pre-election opinion polls be banned? A third of MPs think so (November
13, 2013). NewStatesman. Retrieved from: http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/11/should-pre-
election-opinion-polls-be-banned-third-mps-think-so.
3 Morton et al. (2015) identification strategy exploits a 2005 French voting reform that came into place
precisely to a avoid the situations where exit polls were public before some voters went to vote.
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assumed that the implemented policy is a combination of the parties’ proposals with
weights given by their vote shares. Voters care about the implemented policy, which
implies that they have preferences over the vote shares received by the parties. Even
though there is a continuum of voters we will assume that they behave as if they could
have some (small) impact on the electoral outcome. In this case, an agent’s optimal
voting decision might depend on the other agents behavior. Voters have incomplete
information about each other’s preferences and therefore about their voting behavior.
A voter’s information about other voters’ preferences can be improved through a series
of polls. Polls provide information on the percentage of people who declare that they
will vote for each party as well as the percentage of undecided people. It is assumed
that agents always respond honestly to the questions in the opinion polls. It turns out
that the agents most likely to report that they do not know what they will vote yet are
the more moderate ones.
The paper first shows under which conditions on the distribution of citizens’ pref-
erences a sequence of polls will be able to reveal the complete information case. With
every poll the undecided mass of agents decreases, as more citizens are sure of what
to vote. After enough polls agents have (almost) complete information. However, for
other distributions of voters’ preferences, after a number of polls the undecided mass
of agents stops decreasing and additional polls cannot provide any further information.
The paper also shows that the implemented policy is not monotonic in the number
of polls: the publication of one last additional poll before the election may result in
an implemented policy that is further away from the policy that would result under
complete information.
To the best of our knowledge this is the only paper that examines polls and propor-
tional representation together in a dynamic setting. It is also important to mention that
this model provides three predictions: (1) the positive correlation between undecid-
edness and centrist ideologies, (2) the non-monotonicity of vote shares with respect
to the number of opinion polls and (3) the decrease of the mass of undecided voters
when more polls are published. As explained below, each of these three predictions
can be also generated by other models but we do not know of any model that predicts
the three of them at the same time.
1.1 Related literature
Many papers have examined how opinion polls affect voters and parties through the
information they reveal. Denter and Sisak (2015) show that poll results affect cam-
paigning spending which in turn affect how voters vote. Bernhardt et al. (2009), Morgan
and Stocken (2008) and Meirowitz (2005) show that polls are used to clear uncertainty
over voters preferences, but at the same time this can give rise to strategic poll answer-
ing on behalf of the voters. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) show that polls create
a “bandwagon” effect in favor of the leading party, while Goeree and Großer (2006)
and Taylor and Yildirim (2010) show that the opposite “underdog” effect can appear
through the mobilization of the voters of the trailing party. In both of these papers it
is argued that through polls it is possible that the “wrong” side may win. Klor and
Winter (2006) show in an experiment that in both close and lopsided elections polls
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have a bandwagon effect, and in a later paper (Klor and Winter 2014) they use US
Gubernatorial elections data to show that the increase in participation in elections is
greater for the supporters of the leading candidate. Großer and Schram (2010) find
similar results. Herrmann (2014) examines polls under proportional representation
and shows that voters act strategically, trying to anticipate the future coalitions after
the election takes place. In his model there are three types of voters using the results of
polls to vote strategically in order to influence the future coalitions, while in our model
there is a continuum of voters whose voting intentions have a dynamic relationship
with poll results.
The implemented policy seen as a compromise among different ideological sides, or
power sharing, is not a new idea (Alesina and Rosenthal 1996; Grossman and Helpman
1996; Llavador 2006; Sinopoli and Iannantuoni 2007; Saporiti 2014; Matakos et al.
2015, 2016; Herrera et al. 2015) . Ortuño-Ortín (1997) discusses a two-party setting
where implemented policy is a convex combination of the two parties’ platforms
generated using a continuous function of the parties’ shares in the election. Sahuguet
and Persico (2006) point out that in a proportional system parties need to maximize
their share (rather the probability of getting at least 50% of the vote) and that the
implemented policy is at least partly influenced by the minority party.
Herrera et al. (2015), in a proportional representation setting similar to the one of
this paper, show that the “marginal voter’s curse” has the effect that voters with low
quality information abstain and do not vote for fear of casting a vote for the wrong side.
Finally, voters may choose to support the party to which they feel least ideologically
close, an idea which is shared by the concept of the “protest vote” by which voters
may want to punish, or control the power of their favorite party (see eg. Myatt 2017).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and
provides the main results about the possible convergence to the full information case.
Section 3 concludes.
2 Model description
We assume a uni-dimensional policy space D ⊂ . The voters have single-peaked
preferences over this policy space and their optimal policies are distributed over D
according to a distribution function F(·) which is assumed to be continuous, strictly
increasing and differentiable with a corresponding density function f (·). We identify
a voter’s type with her ideal policy. The utility of a voter of type x ∈ D from the
implemented policy x̂ is given by the function v(|̂x − x |), i.e. it is a function of the
absolute distance between x and the implemented policy x̂ . Function v(|̂x − x |) is
decreasing and concave in |̂x − x | and it has a unique maximum at x̂ = x such that
v(0) = 0. These mean that the utility function of a voter is symmetric around her
optimal policy point where the utility is maximum and normalized to zero. There
are two parties running in the election, L and R, each having a fixed policy position
at 0 and 1 respectively. The actual implemented policy, x(p), will be a compromise
between those two policy positions, namely:
x(p) = (1 − p) × 0 + p × 1 = p,
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Table 1 Decision of a voter at
0.4 L share Implemented policy Decision
0.8 0.2 R
0.3 0.7 L
where p is the share of votes party R gets. This share is defined as p = m R
mL+m R , with
mL and m R being the voter masses that voted for L and R respectively, meaning that
the parties’ shares are calculated over the mass of voters that actually voted. If u is
the mass of the citizens that decide not to vote then mL + m R + u = 1. The setting is
similar to Ortuño-Ortín (1999). Since x(p) = p we use p to describe the vote share
received by R as well as the implemented policy.
Notice that p = m R
mL+m R implies that the parties’ shares of influence in the imple-
mented policy are equal to their vote shares.4 Even though this assumption is made
for simplicity and clarity, all the results follow if we instead assume the more flexible
weight function
pˆ =
(
m R
mL+m R
)γ
(
m R
mL+m R
)γ +
(
mL
mL+m R
)γ
with γ ≥ 1 and finite as in, for example, Saporiti (2014) and Matakos et al. (2015,
2016). Obviously, for γ = 1, p = pˆ. As γ increases then the share of the bigger
party increases, and that of the smaller party decreases. This captures the fact that
some parliamentary systems, while mostly proportional, give some bonus seats to the
biggest party or demand a certain percentage threshold to be passed before they assign
seats to smaller parties.
Given that there is a continuum of agents, no single agent can affect the implemented
policy. We assume, however, that agents want to behave as if anybody could move the
implemented policy in certain direction. Thus, if an agent x > p voted for L , after the
outcome is revealed, she will regret the way she voted. Even though her vote could
not change anything she voted in the “wrong direction.” For this reason, each voter
would like to know how the other voters are behaving before she chooses which party
to vote for. Consider Table 1 where we analyze the decision of a voter located at 0.4.
This voter is closer to 0 than to 1, but if she expects that too many voters will vote for
the left party (first row) the implemented policy will be on her left and therefore she
would like to vote for party R.
2.1 Complete information equilibrium
If the distribution function F(·) is common knowledge we can easily describe the
behavior of voters. Let σx denote the vote strategy chosen by agent x . We assume that
σx ∈ {σ Lx , σ Rx , σ 1/2x }. The interpretation is that σ Lx (σ Rx ) means a vote for L (R) and
4 Under this formulation an alternative interpretation of the voters’ utility is that they have direct preferences
over the parties’ shares themselves.
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σ
1/2
x means that with probability 1/2 the agent votes for L . Let σ = (σx )x∈ be a list
of strategies one for each type of agent and let p(σ ) be the associated percentage of
votes obtained by party R.
Definition 1 A list of strategies σ = (σx )x∈ constitutes a complete information
voting equilibrium (CIVE) if ∀x ∈ D:
σx = σ Lx implies p(σ ) > x ,
σx = σ Rx implies p(σ ) < x ,
σx = σ 1/2x implies p(σ ) = x .
The equilibrium concept is similar to the one in Gerber and Ortuño-Ortín (1998).
It is not difficult to see that our CIVE is a standard strong Nash equilibrium. An agent
votes to move the implemented policy toward her ideal policy. Even though she cannot
do it on her own, she might believe that people with types close to hers will behave
in the same way. In equilibrium there is no set of agents (with positive measure) that
can deviate from their strategies and change the outcome in a beneficial way for all of
them.
Notice that the equilibrium defines a cut-off point x∗ = p(σ ) that divides the
electorate in two parts: all agents to the left (right) of the implemented policy vote for
L(R).
Theorem 1 There always exists a unique complete information voting equilibrium
σ ∗ characterized by the cut-off point x∗ = 1 − F(x∗).
Proof By continuity of F(·) the point x∗ exists, and by strict monotonicity this point
is unique. Now, let x∗ be the implemented policy. Then strategy profile σ ∗ implies
that the voters to the left of x∗ vote for L and the ones to the right of x∗ vote for R.
Notice that the mass of voters of type x∗ is zero, so that the mass of voters of L is
F(x∗) and the mass of voters of R is 1 − F(x∗). In turn, these masses give rise to the
implemented policy x∗ = 0 × F(x∗) + 1 × (1 − F(x∗)) = 1 − F(x∗), which proves
that an equilibrium always exists, and since x∗ is unique there is only one equilibrium
defined by x∗ = 1 − F(x∗).
The last step is to show that there is no other equilibrium. Suppose that there is
an equilibrium implemented policy x ′∗ 	= x∗. The equilibrium strategy implies that
everybody to the left (right) of x ′ vote for L (R), giving rise to the implemented policy
x ′′ = 1 − F(x ′), but we have that x ′′ 	= x ′, which leads to a contradiction. 
unionsq
Notice that x∗ = 1 − F(x∗) does not necessarily correspond to the median policy
x M , F(x M ) = 1/2. The only case in which we obtain a “median voter outcome” is
when x M = 1/2.5
2.2 Polls
When the distribution of voters is common knowledge, voters can calculate
x∗ = 1 − F(x∗) and infer what they should vote. However, when the distribution
5 Since in this case we would have 12 = 1 − F( 12 ), so F( 12 ) = 12 .
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is no longer known to the voters, we have incomplete information, and some voters do
not have enough information to be certain which party they should vote for. For some
other agents this will not be a problem. For example, any agent of type x < 0 will
always vote for L regardless what other agents do. Thus, it is clear that all agents with
type outside the interval [0, 1] have a dominant strategy. We will call agents with x < 0
as left partisans and agents x > 1 as right partisans. It will be useful to denote by ρL
the mass of left partisans, and by ρR the mass of right partisans, i.e. ρL = F(0) and
ρR = 1−F(1). We denote the agents in [0, 1] as moderate. These agents have no dom-
inant strategies, but the only relevant information they need to calculate their optimal
strategy is the share of votes that each party will get. It can be argued, then, that polls
can provide this information. The problem is, however, that “Voting intentions may
change from day to day as the voters’ perceptions evolve during a campaign, so that
a poll, when published, may invalidate itself.” (Myerson and Weber 1993, page 102).
The question then is to find under which circumstances the election under incomplete
information and polls leads to the same outcome as when the distribution of agents’
types is common knowledge. The answer to this question depends very much on the
assumptions on voters’ beliefs and the way they use the information provided by the
polls. Here we will adopt a very simple model to deal with those issues that will yield
clear results. We believe, however, that the basic results are robust to more general
specifications as we discuss below.
We suppose that there is a sequence of polls at periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1. The
election takes place at period T . The question asked is: “what are you going to vote
on the day of the election?” For t < T we write vix,t , i ∈ {0, 1,∅} to denote the voting
intention that agent x (if asked) declares in period t . Thus, v0x,t (v1x,t ) denotes that x
will vote for L (R) and v∅x,t denotes that x does not know yet. This possibility of
“ indecision” is essential in our model. This is also a very common feature in many
real elections.
A poll at the end of period t is a vector Pt = (εt , ut ) such that εt is the percentage
of people that, during period t , announced the intention to vote for L and ut the
percentage of people who announced not to know yet which party they will vote for.
Thus we see a poll as providing information on current intentions (in this sense a poll
is not a prediction of the election outcome). We assume that Pt is a statistically perfect
poll and appropriately samples and measures voting intentions at that period. We may
write the outcome of the election as εT ≡ { percentage of voters who vote for L}.
At each period t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 agent x has subjective beliefs on the out-
come εT given by βx,t . These beliefs are characterized by a CDF on [0, 1], i.e.
βx,t (y) =Probability{εT ≤ y}. In general βx,t will depend on the original beliefs
βx,0 and the information provided by the polls Pt ′ , t ′ < t . Define
mx,t = sup{y : βx,t (y) = 0}
Mx,t = inf{y : βx,t (y) = 1}.
We suppose that at period t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, agent x responds to a poll in the
following way:
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vx,t =
⎧
⎨
⎩
v1x,t if mx,t 0 + (1 − mx,t )1 < x
v0x,t if Mx,t 0 + (1 − Mx,t )1 ≥ x
v∅x,t otherwise.
(1)
Expression (1) just says that an agent answers that her vote will be for, say, R if
the implemented policy can never be, according to her beliefs, to the right of her ideal
policy. This is equivalent to saying that agents want to rule out the possibility of regret,
i.e., the possibility that later on they do something different from what they had stated.
Thus, agents only announce their vote intention when they are quite sure about it.
This may be seen as a very ad hoc feature of our model. We believe, however, that
there is some intuitive justification for it. Moreover, the results in this paper are robust
to changes that allow for more “flexible” rules. Thus, suppose that agents announce
their vote intentions even though they are not completely sure about their final vote.
The results would be similar to the ones provided here as long as agents believe that
with a high enough probability they will vote for the same party they said they were
going to vote.6
Now we have to describe the way people vote at period T . There are several ways
to model this decision problem. Here we will assume that voters follow the rule in
(1).7
A type x agent will vote for L (R) only if the expected implemented policy—
according to her subjective beliefs—is to the right (left) of x . In the case the expected
implemented policy coincides with the ideal policy an agent will vote with probability
0.5 for L (this is not essential and we could, alternatively, assume that she does not
vote). Notice that the rule in (1) implies that agents who are undecided at period T do
not vote.
One might object against this type of behavior because it does not depend on the
utility function. It turns out that this is not a problem in our model. Agents who were
not undecided at period T −1 will not be undecided at period T either, so their behavior
would not change if we introduce the expected utility in (1). The problem arises with
people who at period T —the election day—do not know yet if the outcome will be
to the right or the left of their ideal policies. In principle, it seems more reasonable to
assume that they consider the expected utility rather than the expected outcome. This
alternative, however, would not change the type of qualitative results provided in this
paper and so we stick to (1) for simplicity. Our results are also robust to other decision
criteria for the undecided agents on the day of the election.
6 An alternative approach would assume that an agent announces her vote for the party that, for example, in
expected terms is more likely to be the one she finally votes for. This, however, would rule out the possibility
of undecided agents. Moreover, this approach requires more information than the one we assume here about
the way agents change their beliefs βx,t .
7 Another possible rule is to assume that the relevant variable is the expected value of the implemented
policy. Thus, at period T agent x votes in the following way:
σx =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
σ 0x if
∫ 1
0 (x − ε)dβx,t (ε) < 0
σ 1x if
∫ 1
0 (x − ε)dβx,t (ε) > 0
σ
1/2
x otherwise.
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Now we must specify the way beliefs may change through time. Let
Pt−1 = (εt−1, ut−1) be the information provided by the poll at the end of period
t − 1. Then the beliefs at period t are such that for all x
Mx,t = εt−1 + ut−1
mx,t = εt−1. (2)
Here we are saying that agents believe that the number of votes that L (R) will
get cannot be less than εt−1 (more than εt−1 + ut−1). Notice that this restriction is
compatible with the possibility that the ratio of votes in favor of L over votes in favor
of R changes over time. The equalities in (2) also imply that, at period t , agents believe
that with some positive probability (almost) all undecided agents will vote L and with
some positive probability (almost) all undecided agents will vote R. In other words,
this assumption captures the idea of a very imperfect information on the distribution of
types. Since the expressions in (2) are the same for all agents we can drop the subscript
and write Mt and mt .
We must now specify the beliefs agents have at period t = 0, when no poll has
been conducted yet. We will assume—consistent with the idea that agents have a very
imperfect information on F—that first period beliefs, εx,0, are such that only agents
outside the interval (0, 1) will be sure about the party they will vote for. Therefore,
we have that P0 = (ε0, u0), where ε0 = F(0) and u0 = F(1) − F(0). Recall that
we denote by ρL the mass of left partisans, and byρR the mass of right partisans,
i.e. ρL = F(0) and ρR = 1 − F(1), so that we can also write the initial beliefs as
P0 = (ρL , 1 − ρR − ρL).
We know that after publishing poll Pt = (εt , ut ) all agents know that the final
implemented policy will lie in the interval [lt , rt ] ⊆ [0, 1] where
lt = 1 − Mt
rt = 1 − mt .
Indeed, if all the undecided agents at period t finally vote for party L the implemented
policy would be lt = 0× Mt +1× (1− Mt ) = 1−εt−1 −ut−1, and if all of them vote
for party R the implemented policy would be rt = 0 ×mt + 1× (1−mt ) = 1− εt−1.
Thus, after poll t is published the set of still undecided agents coincides with the
interval [lt , rt ] and, given all our above assumptions, when poll t + 1 is conducted
agents with x < lt (x > rt ) will respond that they will vote for L (R), and agents
x ∈ [lt , rt ] will declare to be undecided.
We are interested in the sequence of polls and elections outcomes
P0 = (ε0, u0), P1 = (ε1, u1), . . . , PT −1 = (εT−1, uT−1), εT .
Let ε∗ denote the vote share obtained by L in the complete information case. If
polls are good aggregators of information we should observe εT = ε∗, or at least
limT→∞ εT = ε∗. (By T → ∞ we mean that the number of polls, before the election
day, goes to infinity). A sufficient condition for this to happen is that
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lim
T→∞(εT−1, uT−1) = (ε
∗, 0). (3)
At period t = 0 we have P0 = (ε0, u0). Now it is quite straightforward to calculate
X1L , the set of types who at period t = 1 announce to vote for L:
X1L = {x ≤ l1, where l1 = 1 − F(1)} . (4)
In a similar way the set of types who announce to vote for R is
X1R = {x ≥ r1, where r1 = 1 − F(0)} . (5)
Notice that (4) and (5) follow from the behavior described by (1). Agents at period
t = 1 believe that there is some positive probability that almost all undecided agents
at t = 0 vote for L . Were that the case, the implemented policy would be l1 and then
all agents with ideal points to the left of such number should vote for L (a similar
argument works for r1). For the rest of periods we can define—in a similar way to X1L
and X1R—the set of types announcing their vote for L and the set of types announcing
their vote for R:
XtL = {x ≤ lt , where lt = 1 − F(rt−1)}
X1R = {x ≥ rt , where rt = 1 − F(lt−1)} . (6)
Then the variables we need to analyze are lt and rt : at period t agents with type in
the interval [lt , rt ] are undecided and agents with type x < lt (x > rt ) will vote for L
(R). Thus, given initial conditions l0 = 0, r0 = 1 the dynamic process to consider is
given by the following system of equations:
lt = 1 − F(rt−1)
rt = 1 − F(lt−1). (7)
If after, say, s polls in each subsequent poll the interval of the undecided does
not change, then the process has reached a steady state where ls = ls+t = l∗ and
rs = rs+t = r∗, t ≥ 1. Plugging the expression for rt−1 into the expression for lt we
get:
lt = 1 − F(1 − F(lt−2)). (8)
This is a second order difference equation with initial values l0 = 0 and l1 = 1 −
F(r0) = 1 − F(1).
Next, we will establish sufficient conditions for the sequence of polls to converge
to the complete information outcome. First define
h(x) ≡ 1 − F(1 − F(x)), x ∈ [0, 1].
Notice that the function h(x) captures the dynamic in (8).
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Theorem 2 If h′(x) = F ′(1 − F(x))F ′(x) < 1 ∀x ∈ [0, 1] then a sequence of polls
will converge to the complete information outcome.
Proof Notice that the complete information outcome, x∗, is a fixed point of h(x).
Indeed, since x∗ = 1−F(x∗), we have that h(x∗)=1−F(1−F(x∗))=1−F(x∗)= x∗.
Therefore, if h(x) has a unique fixed point it will be the complete information outcome
and the (probably infinite) sequence of polls will make lt to converge to its complete
information value. It is straightforward to see that in that case rt also converges to
the complete information value. Uniqueness of h(x) is not guaranteed however, and
depends on the form of the distribution function F(·). Given that h(x) is continuous
and increasing, and h(0) > 0, it is clear that the condition h′(x) < 1 in [0, 1] is
enough to guarantee that there is a unique fixed point in [0, 1]. 
unionsq
The following straightforward corollary establishes when the sequence of polls will
converge to a fixed point that could be different from the one associated to the complete
information one.
Corollary 1 Let x∗ be the smallest fixed point of h(x). A sufficient condition for lt to
converge to x∗ is that F ′(1 − F(x))F ′(x) < 1 holds for all x ∈ [0, x∗].
Therefore, if F ′(1− F(x))F ′(x) < 1 holds in [0, 1] then the complete information
outcome is a unique fixed point of h(·), and a sequence of possibly infinite polls will
converge to it. In absence of fixed point uniqueness Corollary 1 also tells us that if
there is a fixed point x∗ such that x∗ < x∗ with x∗ being the fixed point corresponding
to the complete information outcome, and if F ′(1 − F(x))F ′(x) < 1 is satisfied in
the interval [0, x∗], then we will have a mass of undecided voters located in [x∗, x¯∗],
with x¯∗ = 1 − F(x∗). In this case, the polls cannot lead to complete information, and
there will always be some positive mass of undecided voters in [x∗, x¯∗], no matter
how many polls will be conducted afterwards.
Inequality F ′(1 − F(x))F ′(x) < 1 may seem a little strange; however it can be
intuitively explained in the case of a symmetric distribution of the undecided at period
0. It provides a sort of upper bound on the maximum of the probability density function
or, putting it differently, an implicit lower limit on the variance of the distribution. When
most of the mass of the undecided is located close to the mean of the distribution, their
influence in the election is potentially so large that there can be no improvement in
information in the sense of having less undecided agents.
To illustrate the insight of the Theorem, we provide a couple of examples with
different voters’ preferences distributions. First, assuming that F is uniform on the
interval D = [−qL , 1 + qR], we have that:
F ′(1 − F(x))F ′(x) = 1
(1 + qR + qL)2 . (9)
Given qR + qL > 0, then 1(1+qR+qL )2 < 1, therefore the sufficient condition for
uniqueness and convergence holds for all x ∈ [0, 1]. On the other hand, a symmetric
triangle distribution with small masses of partisan voters provides an extreme case
for which the condition fails. In fact, a simple numerical application shows that for
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Fig. 1 Examples of h(x)
qL = 0.05 and qR = 0.07 and the triangle distribution, polls cannot improve infor-
mation that much since at least 98.5% of the voters in [0, 1] will remain undecided.
Figure 1 shows the plots of the h(·) function for the two cases mentioned above.
In the uniform case, there exists only the fixed point corresponding to the complete
information outcome which can be achieved with enough polls. In contrast, in the
triangular distribution case, we can see that there are three fixed points: the complete
information one, x∗, in the middle, the left one, xl , where lt converges to, and the third
one xr , where rt converges to. It is easy to see that the condition for lt to converge to
the complete information outcome does not in fact hold. The two non-middle fixed
points define the interval where the minimum possible mass of undecided agents is
located on.
In terms of the implemented policy, we can calculate for each poll what the imple-
mented policy would be if that poll were the last one to be conducted. In this way
we get a sequence of possible implemented policies associated with a given sequence
of polls. If the sequence of polls converges to the complete information outcome,
the corresponding sequence of implemented policies converges to x∗. Otherwise, it
converges to an implemented policy that lies somewhere in [x∗, x¯∗]. Regardless of
where the sequence of possible implemented polices converges to, this convergence
is not necessarily monotonic in the number of polls. Thus, in general there is no way
to know if one extra poll before the election will bring the implemented policy closer
to the complete information policy or not.
In the Appendix, we examine an extension of the model that allows for some day-to-
day political noise that can shift the ideological position of the agents to the left or the
right. The only significant difference is that in this case the polls can never help reach
the complete information outcome, so there will always be some undecided voters.
This extension provides some other interesting insights. In fact one implication is that
the results of the model can follow even with potentially biased polls or with agents
lying, as long as the bias is relatively small. What this means is that if the results of
polls are biased and this bias is a random variable with a known support, the voters can
still calculate minimum and maximum implemented policies by taking into account
the most extreme cases of bias possible. If the bias is relatively small the mechanism
of the model still works with the only difference that in this case polls can never bring
the society to complete information. On the other hand, if the bias is relatively large,
polls are unable to offer any information to the undecided voters.
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An important assumption that we have maintained so far is that agents respond
honestly to polls. Even though this might be seen as a strong assumption, the alternative
model with fully strategic agents would be intractable. Moreover, the discussion in the
Appendix shows that our model can deal with the case in which some partisan voters
might misrepresent their views as long as the share of such strategic agents is not too
large.
3 Conclusions
In this paper we examine a proportional representation voting model with polls in
which the distribution of voter preferences is unknown. The model provides three
predictions, that to the best of our knowledge cannot all three be replicated by any
other model. First, the lack of monotonicity of the shares of parties in the number
of polls, second, the mass of undecided voters is decreasing in the number of polls,
and third, there is a positive correlation between having a centrist ideology and being
undecided. The most important finding of the paper is that although each poll weakly
decreases the mass of undecided voters, a sequence of polls may not always be able
to decrease this mass to zero and reveal the complete information outcome to the
voters. On top of that, there might be polls that actually push the society away from
the complete information case: if the last poll before the election is such a poll, and
we are interested in having an election result as close to the complete information as
possible, this poll should not have happened. On the other hand, this negative effect
can be remedied by having a new additional poll. Without information about how the
distribution of preferences looks like we cannot know if the final extra poll before the
election has a beneficial effect or not. However, if the number of polls is sufficiently
large the outcome approaches as much as possible to the complete information case.
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Appendix: Position uncertainty
Even though the voters have preferences over the implemented policy, it can often
be the case that their opinions can change from day to day, due to random political
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noise. The assumption that this section maintains is that, while a voter’s ideological
position can change due to random shocks, this position will not move too far away
from her initial ideological position. We will model this by assuming that the optimal
policy for a voter with initial position x can move randomly around a small interval
[x − e, x + e], with e > 0. This is the only difference with the previous model. That
is each voter’s optimal policy can change from day to day, moving randomly in this
small interval. For simplicity we assume that partisan voters do not get the shock.
The timing of the new set-up is as follows. At time t the agents calculate [lt , rt ], a
poll takes place to which the agents respond truthfully and then a shock takes place.
Afterwards we can have the election, or we start over with a new poll. The shock is not
necessarily common to all voters. Each voter x is aware of her initial optimal policy
and the interval [x − e, x + e] that her future optimal policy can fall into. Notice that
under this setting (with the exception of partisan voters), agents who are located in
[lt − e, lt ] can no longer announce that they will vote for L: they understand that in
the future, because of the random shock, they might find themselves on the other side
of lt . Similarly, agents who are in [rt , rt + e] cannot announce they will vote for R.
From this example it should be clear that the interval where undecided voters fall in
each period is simply [lt − e, rt + e], and that the sets of types that announce that they
will vote for L and R in period t become:
XtL =
{
x ≤ l ′t , where l ′t = lt − e
}
XtR =
{
x ≥ r ′t , where r ′t = rt + e
}
.
(10)
The dynamic process is now:
lt = 1 − F(r ′t−1)
rt = 1 − F(l ′t−1).
(11)
Rewriting the previous two equations and plugging the second one into the other we
get:
lt = 1 − F(1 − F(lt−2 − e) + e). (12)
If similarly to Sect. 2 we define the function:
he(x) = 1 − F(1 − F(x − e) + e), (13)
we see that all the conditions for the existence of a fixed point still hold. Now however,
there is no fixed point that corresponds to full information in the sense we have defined
it previously. In other words, there does not exist a fixed point where all the voters
have made up their minds.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the uncertainty in voters’ ideologies is as described in
this Appendix. Then the complete information outcome cannot be achieved regardless
the number of polls.
Proof Suppose not. Then there exists an s such that l ′s = r ′s = l ′s+1 = r ′s+1 = l ′∗ = r ′∗.
Then by (10) we have:
l∗ − e = r∗ + e
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or,
l∗ = r∗ + 2e
which is a contradiction as l∗ cannot be greater than r∗. 
unionsq
We can also see that results of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 follow immediately using:
F ′(1 − F(x − e) + e)F ′(x − e) < 1 (14)
The natural next question is to find the fixed point that corresponds to the “second
best”, where the mass of the undecided voters is the lowest it can get. An obvious
candidate fixed point is a point where l∗ = r∗ = x∗, that is, the point where there is
no uncertainty about the position of the implemented policy anymore. Then, we will
have l ′∗ = x∗ − e and r ′∗ = x∗ + e.
Proposition 2 There is no fixed point of he(·) of the form l∗ = r∗ = x∗.
Proof Suppose that time s is the first time we observe ls = rs . Then ls+1 =1−F(rs+e)
and rs+1 = 1 − F(ls − e), showing that ls+1 	= rs+1. 
unionsq
Proposition 2 tells us that there cannot be a situation where there is no uncertainty about
the implemented policy, which further implies that the ideological distance between
the last voter to vote for L and the first voter to vote for R cannot be less than 2e. The
exact distance cannot be pinned down without first knowing the voters’ distribution
function.
What we take from the preceding analysis is that the added uncertainty of prefer-
ences makes not only the full information outcome completely unattainable, but also
puts a lower bound on the measure of undecided voters. As e gets smaller we get as
close as possible to full information.
If e becomes too big (e > 1) then polls essentially break down: only the first poll
improves the information of the individuals because the only agents to ever respond
to the polls are the partisan ones.
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